Researchers propose simple fix to thwart e-voting attack

Researchers propose simple fix to thwart e-voting attack

Researchers have devised a simple procedure that can be added to many electronic voting machine routines to reduce the success of insider attacks that attempt to alter results.

The approach, laid out in a short research paper (PDF), augments the effectiveness of end-to-end verifiable election systems, such as the Scantegrity and the MarkPledge. They're designed to generate results that can be checked by anyone, by giving each voter a receipt that contains a cryptographic hash of the ballot contents. --->>>

See also: E-voting remains insecure, despite paper trail

Microsoft Research has revealed a potential flaw in verifiable e-voting machines through which fraudsters could easily use discarded ballot receipts as a guide for altering votes. Fortunately, the researchers also offered a solution -- linking new receipts to previous ones with cryptographic hashes -- but that alone won't make e-voting entirely secure, they cautioned. --->>>

Welcome To the World of Cryptographic Voting | Dr. Dobb's | November 19, 2009

Dr. Dobb's | Welcome To the World of Cryptographic Voting | November 19, 2009:

In a recent Takoma Park, Md. election, a new cryptographic voting system that ensures accurate vote counts was used for the first time in a real election. Scantegrity II is an open source election verification technology for optical scan voting systems.

It uses privacy preserving confirmation numbers to allow each voter to verify her vote is counted. The confirmation numbers also allow anyone to verify that all the votes were counted correctly. The system is a variation on conventional optical-scan voting. But instead of filling in a bubble next to a candidate's name, the voter uses a special pen that exposes a code printed inside the bubble in invisible ink. Voters can write down that code, along with the serial number of their ballot, to later verify the results online.